May 3, 2000. Copyright 2000. Graphic News. All rights reserved.

THE NATO CAPABILITY GAP
By Ken Petrie

LONDON, May 3, Graphic News: THE 78-day air war against Serbia in March-June 1999 resulted in the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Kosovo and an acceptance of the presence of 52,000 NATO troops in the province. The war, however, revealed a disparity in the capabilities of NATO membersÕ armed forces.

During the war over 38,000 sorties were flown; this included 10,424 attack missions, expending over 23,600 munitions. Although all 19 NATO countries participated in one form or another the United States played the dominant role. It paid 80% of the cost of the air campaign, provided 650 of the 927 aircraft, delivered more than 80% of all the ordnance, flew 52% of all attack missions and performed just over 70% of all combat support missions.

The United States B1, B2 and B52 long range bombers flew only 320 sorties, yet dropped roughly half of the bombs and missiles used during the war. The command-and-control system was cumbersome, revealing the difficulties inherent in waging war as a coalition.

ÒOperation Joint GuardianÓ, NATOÕs subsequent peacekeeping operation in Kosovo revealed additional problems.  Although the U.S. and her NATO allies were able to deploy a large air armada to bases on the periphery of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, moving and sustaining ground forces was more challenging. NATOÕs European members struggled to deploy 40,000 troops, a mere 2% of their combined total of two million.  

Their armed forces look much the same as during the Cold War. Many lack the mobility necessary to deploy outside their own borders and they lack the logistic support to sustain combat operations.

The transatlantic capability gap is most pronounced in the cutting-edge areas of warfare, such as precision attacks, command-and-control, and intelligence gathering. AmericaÕs allies lacked the equipment necessary to gather detailed intelligence, attack targets with precision and sustain their forces.

Some 35% of the 23,600 bombs and missiles used were precision-guided-munitions (PGMs).  The U.S. air forces used a far larger number of PGMs than their European and Canadian counterparts. Only the U.S. and the UK had Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAMs).  The UK launched 20 TLAMs whereas the U.S. launched 240 surface launched TLAMs and 60 air-launched cruise missiles. Only the U.S. with its Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), complete with Global Positioning System (GPS), was able to attack targets in all types of weather.

During the Kosovo war, the Alliance was highly dependent upon the United StatesÕ airborne and satellite imagery.

Although NATO has taken a number of steps to try to bridge the capability gap there is little sign of an effective narrowing. Part of the problem is the disparity of available funds. The U.S. spent $283 billion on defence in 1999. The European members of NATO spent a combined total of $174 billion, and many are cutting their defence budgets. Much of what is spent goes not towards new technology or better training, but towards the costs of short-term conscripts, pensions, and infrastructure.
/ENDS
Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies