October 20, 1999. Copyright 1999. Graphic News. All rights reserved.

EMBARGOED UNTIL 1030 ON 21 OCTOBER 1999 

LESSONS FROM KOSOVO
LONDON, October 20, Graphic News: WHILE IN strictly military terms, NATO achieved its aim of forcing Yugoslav forces to withdraw from Kosovo and the deployment of ground forces allowed the return of displaced people, a number of lessons about weapons and equipment require urgent attention by NATO and its partner countries. 
According to the 1999-2000 Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the more important lessons that need to be addressed are surveillance and target acquisition; precision-guided weapons; combat support aircraft; and land-force deployment capabilities.
Because of a shortage of reliable human intelligence unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) played an important role in gathering data for target-acquisition and assessment processes. The most sophisticated UAV used in operations was the United StatesÕ Predator, which can operate at altitudes up to 24,900 feet (7,600 metres) and has an endurance of up to 24 hours. It also has full data link capabilities, which can be fully integrated into ground and airborne command control and communications systems.
The CL-289 Ð operated by Germany and France Ð is less capable, operating up to an altitude of 2,000 feet (600 metres) with an endurance of just 30 minutes.
The political restraints on military planners increased the importance of precision-guided weapons. The need to minimize the loss of aircraft and aircrew required most aircraft to operate above 16,400 feet (5,000 metres). At present most precision-guided weapons use laser, television or infrared guidance systems which require line-of-sight with the target during the acquisition and delivery process. Consequently bad weather renders them ineffective. Only the U.S. had sufficient stocks of weapons that receive guidance from satellites and are not dependent on line-of-sight for targeting.
Of the 37,500 sorties flown the ratio of combat support to bombing missions was 3:1. The U.S. provided the vast majority of combat-support aircraft. If the Europeans have any pretensions for an independent military capability they need to improve their combat support inventory.
A significant proportion of some two million NATO active duty personnel from European countries are conscripts. They are therefore limited in deployment outside their homeland and are not sufficiently trained to engage in a wide range of operations using modern weapons and equipment. 
Additionally there is a lack of specialist military personnel in engineering, medical and communications disciplines. Moreover the lack of transport aircraft requires American help to deploy forces quickly.
If the EU leaders declared requirement of Òa capacity for autonomous action backed by a credible military forceÓ is to become a reality, increases in defence spending, or a radical reallocation of resources, along with genuine collaboration in defence procurement, are necessary.
/ENDS
Source: The 1999-2000 Military Balance, published by the IISS